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5.1  Introduction 
Equity portfolio flows to developing countries have  increased sharply in 
magnitude in recent years, especially to the so-called emerging countries. Total 
equity flows to developing countries are estimated to have been $13.2 billion 
in 1993, quadruple that of three years earlier (table 5.1). Equity flows are quite 
concentrated among a small group of emerging countries (e.g., Latin America 
received about 60 percent of all equity flows to developing countries in 1993). 
Though relatively still small for developing countries on aggregate (about 7 
percent of the aggregate net financing they received in 1993), these flows are 
an important source of finance for some developing countries. 
Equity flows have taken place in a number of forms: direct equity purchases 
by investors in the host stock markets, investments through country funds, is- 
sue of rights on equities held by depository institutions (American and global 
depository receipts [ADRs and GDRs]  ),I  and direct foreign equity offerings. 
In the last three years equity flows have taken place largely through depository 
receipts. The volume of ADRs/GDRs issued for equity claims of  developing 
countries is estimated to have been about $18.2 billion over  1989-93.2 Until 
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Table 5.1  Equity Flows to Developing Countries (millions of dollars, estimates) 
Total 
Type of Flow  1989  1990  1991  1992  19934  1989-93” 
Country funds  $2.2  $2.9  $1.2  $1.3  $2.7  $10.3 
ADRsIGDRs  -  $0.1  $4.9  $5.9  $7.3  $18.2 
Direct equity  $1.3  $0.8  $1.5  $5.8  $3.2  $12.6 
Total  $3.5  $3.8  $7.6  $13.0  $13.2  $41.1 
Source: World Debt Tables (1993). 
“estimated  for 1993. 
recently, next in importance were (closed-end) country funds: during 1989-93, 
new country funds were created for developing countries with an aggregated 
size of  $10.3 billion. The sharpest relative increase in the last few years has 
been direct purchases of  equities: these were about $5.8 billion in  1992, up 
from $0.8 billion in 1990, and were second in importance from 1989 through 
1993. 
The  increased  importance  of  direct  equity  purchases  by  foreigners  on 
emerging stock markets may be attributed in part to the progressive removal of 
barriers by developing countries on foreign participation in their stock markets. 
Many developing countries have removed restrictions on foreign ownership, 
liberalized capital account transactions, improved their accounting and infor- 
mation  standards, and in  general have made it easier for foreigners to gain 
access to their markets (see, further, for example, Mathieson and Rojas-Suirez 
1993 and Reisen and Fischer 1993). Particularly in Europe and Latin America, 
many countries now have very few or no restrictions on access by  foreigners 
to their markets and treat foreign investors in most ways identical to domestic 
investors. 
At the same time, returns on stock markets in emerging countries have been 
high; for example, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) composite in- 
dex for Latin America was up 294.2 percent over 1988-92, compared to 108.4 
percent for the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500). This also may have been 
a factor motivating the larger inflows of foreign equity. At the same time, how- 
ever, the volatility of rates of return has been high, reaching, for example, more 
than 100 percent for Argentina. 
The increase of these equity flows to a number of developing countries and 
the opening up of their stock markets raise a number of issues. An important 
one is the effect of the removal of barriers on the risk-return trade-off in these 
markets, that is, how much has the risk-return trade-off changed? The purpose 
of this paper is to investigate this question and to quantify the effects of barriers 
to access by foreign investors on stock prices and rates of return. 
To  answer  this question,  we  use  the  newly  created  indexes by  the  IFC 
Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB) on the degree of foreign access or “in- 233  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
vestability.” The IFC investability indexes capture for each stock the barriers 
to free access by foreigners (general inflow or outflow restrictions, general or 
sector-specific ownership restrictions, remittance restrictions, other exchange 
restrictions, restrictions on capital structure, etc.). These indexes should thus 
be a good indicator of the relative importance of barriers across securities at a 
given point in time in one market or across a number of markets, or of changes 
in barriers over time. 
Summarizing our results, we find  a positive relationship between  price- 
earnings (PE)  ratios and the degree of access for almost all the countries. For 
four out of  the seven markets we study in detail, this result is robust to the 
inclusion of  the world beta and the degree of  international spanning of  the 
domestic market. Only for Jordan and Mexico, however, is this result robust to 
the inclusion of the additional factor of the supply of stocks. For the relation- 
ship between rates of return and the investability index, we find evidence of a 
negative sign for Jordan only, which is also less robust. For other countries, we 
do not find that abnormal stock returns are related in a systematic fashion to a 
stock’s investability index. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 5.2 presents an overview of 
possible analytical frameworks. Section 5.3 describes the data we use and pro- 
vides some statistics on the rates of return. We then perform the Stehle (1977) 
test  for market  segmentation or integration for each market  to  investigate 
whether these markets indeed show signs of being segmented. Section 5.4 pro- 
vides the empirical results of these tests of market integration and market seg- 
mentation. We then describe in section 5.5 the concept of the investability in- 
dex as developed by the IFC and provide some statistics on the investability 
indexes. In section 5.6 we perform the tests on the (cross-sectional and time- 
series) relationship between the P/E ratio and the rate of return on an individual 
stock on the one hand and the level of its investability index on the other hand, 
and we perform some robustness tests. Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2  Overview of Possible Analytical Models 
Tests assuming  no barriers. Without barriers, international integration tests 
can be performed using the various international asset pricing models that have 
been developed. Past empirical tests along these lines specifically concerned 
with developing countries-and  which assume no barriers-are,  for example, 
Lessard (1973, 1974); Divecha, Drach, and Stefek (1992); Bekaert (1993); 
Buckberg (1993); Diwan, Errunza, and Senbet (1993b); de Santis (1993); Har- 
vey  (1993); and Tesar and Werner (1993). All the papers find that there are 
significant diversification benefits available from investing in developing coun- 
tries. Most of  these tests, however, use a specific asset pricing model which 
assumes full integration. As a result, one doesn’t know whether these diversifi- 
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Tests assuming barriers. Without explicitly incorporating the type and severity 
of barriers in an asset pricing model, several papers have investigated market 
integration (or segmentation) using the test developed by  Stehle (1977). The 
advantage of  the Stehle methodology is that it allows for tests of  both full 
integration and full segmentation. Jorion and Schwartz (1986), focusing on 
interlisted  stocks,  reject full  market  integration between  Canada  and  the 
United States using this test, something which they attribute to legal barriers. 
Mittoo (1992) investigates the same issue and finds segmentation pre-1981, 
but integration afterward, especially for interlisted stocks. 
With barriers, assets in different markets may have different expected rates 
of return even when their risk characteristics are the same. One way of testing 
integration in the presence of barriers is to model the barriers explicitly, derive 
the resulting theoretical equilibrium asset prices, and verify the model using 
actual asset prices. Following Jorion and Schwartz (1986), barriers can be clas- 
sified into indirect barriers, arising from differences in available information, 
transaction costs, accounting standards, etc.; and legal barriers, arising from 
the different judicial status of  foreign and domestic investors-for  example, 
ownership restrictions and taxes. Typically only legal barriers are incorporated 
in asset pricing models, as these can easily be modeled e~plicitly.~ 
Theoretical models here are Black (1974, 1978); Stulz (1981); and Ermnza 
and Losq (1985, 1989). For imperfectly accessible stocks (i.e., foreigners can 
own stocks up to a fraction 6 less than l), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and 
Stulz and Wasserfallen (1992) develop models. These papers find theoretical 
“mispricing” resulting from the barriers given the specific asset pricing model 
used. As expected, the analytical predictions on asset pricing with barriers CN- 
cially depend on the type of market segmentation. 
There are some empirical investigations building on these models for indus- 
trial countries. Hietala (1989) investigates the pricing of individual Finnish 
stocks which can be owned by  foreign as well as domestic investors (un- 
restricted) versus stocks which can be owned only by domestic investors (re- 
stricted). Other papers have applied these tests to developing countries. Er- 
runza and Losq  (1985) find tentative empirical support for a hypothesis of 
mild4  market segmentation. Ermnza, hsq,  and Padmanabhan (1992) find that 
many emerging markets are neither completely integrated with nor completely 
segmented from industrial countries. 
For imperfectly accessible stocks, Stulz and Wasserfallen (1  992) test their 
model for Swiss stocks and find that a relaxation of investment barriers sub- 
stantially lowers the value of the shares available to foreigners relative only to 
the value of the shares available to all investors. Bailey and Jagtiani (1992) use 
3. For these reasons, Bekaert (1993) employs a nonparametric approach for testing the relation- 
ships between barriers and measures of market integration. 
4. Defined as a situation where the industrial countries’ security markets are well integrated, 
and developing-country investors can invest in all these (foreign) security markets, but foreign 
investors cannot vice versa invest in developing countries. 235  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
this  model to  investigate differential pricing of  restricted and  unrestricted 
stocks for Thailand. They find that cross-sectional difference in the severity of 
foreign ownership explains some of  the variation in the premiums of  un- 
restricted shares over restricted shares, leading to a mildly segmented capital 
market. 
5.3  The Rate of Return Data 
The raw data we have cover twenty emerging markets. The price and rate of 
return data are generally available from 1975 on. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide 
some basic statistics  for the rates of return on the IFC indexes and other market 
data in these emerging markets over the period  1989-92.  Appendix A de- 
scribes the criteria used for creating the indexes. 
As can be  observed from table 5.2, the  IFC indexes have in general in- 
creased, for some countries by multiple factors (e.g., Argentina). There is also 
a great variation in the market capitalization across co~ntries.~  The rates of 
return in emerging markets in general are high, but so are the standard devia- 
tions (table 5.3). The highest rate of  return is for Argentina, more than 100 
percent on an annual basis. However, Argentina also has the highest standard 
deviation, almost 130 percent, and the highest range. In general, the rates of 
return and standard deviations for the emerging markets are much higher than 
those for the industrial countries. Table 5.3 also provides the skewness and 
kurtosis measures, which indicate that the rates of return are not likely drawn 
from normal distributions. Jarque-Bera tests for normality bear this out: for 
most markets it rejects normality (see, further, Claessens, Dasgupta, and Glen 
1993). 
Table 5.4 provides some cross-sectional  information on the monthly rates of 
return of the individual stocks for each market (the methodology used for cre- 
ating the individual stocks' rates of return is described in Claessens, Dasgupta, 
and Glen 1993).  There is a great cross-sectional  variation in the monthly rates 
of  return behavior. Autocorrelation coefficients likewise vary over a wide 
range. 
5.4  Test of Market Segmentation 
We  first use the model of  Stehle (1977), as also applied by  Jorion and 
Schwartz (1986); Ermnza, Losq, and Padmanabhan (1992); and Mittoo (1992), 
to separately investigate the hypothesis of market integration or segmentation 
for each emerging market. The Stehle model assumes that the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) holds and that exchange risk is not priced. The test 
5. It is important to note that the IFC indexes cover only a subset of  all stocks listed on the 
various exchanges, varying between 39 percent (Turkey) and 90  percent (Colombia) in terms of 
market capitalization. 'Ifrpically, because of  its selection criteria, the IFC index will be weighted 
toward the larger market capitalization  and more liquidly traded stocks. Table 5.2  International Finance Corporation (IFC) Indexes and Other Data for Each Market: January 1989 and December 1992 (millions of 
U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted) 
IFC  IFC  IFC 
IFC  IFC  PriceEarnings  PricelBook  Market  IFC  Total 





















... 63  . . .  59.03  . . . 
60  62  233.25  415.96  18.18 
61  91  730.26  518.61  38.46 
62  62  134.12  226.89  36.52 
50  58  176.52  455.14  7.32 
18  30  1526.25  2056.78  12.34 
62  70  866.08  503.74  42.60 
29  51  376.89  900.42  12.83 
26  32  226.14  537.42  10.12 
25  27  132.93  181.79  15.78 
23  30  637.84  503.06  15.05 
18  25  134.41  227.01  2.26 
24  29  188.10  1253.14  0.55 
56  69  95.00  158.92  4.57 
26  35  754.93  3315.58  4.10 
21  20  359.32  2171.64  5.39 
52  62  462.19  2608.21  3.47 
13  17  147.85  523.61  8.80 
15  24  33.82  64.43  5.61 
... 17  . . .  384.76  ..  . 
12.19  . . .  1.60  ...  8661.31  . . .  259.65  . . .  12037.54 
33.74  2.6  14.74  11624.16  25365.18  1068.88  ___  2518.98  65118.90 
21.43  2.75  1.06  54828.72  66461.02  5556.64  6006.51  94233.33  107447.97 
21.84  2.30  2.53  20176.60  47940.53  188.03  773.27  25175.59  94003.82 
21.86  1.21  2.55  825.72  3773.68  6.33  32.74  2427.11  8028.36 
14.13  2.81  2.45  2590.98  8167.09  65.20  83.70  4123.46  13794.50 
16.57  8.35  2.15  90820.99  60454.10  15156.36  3171.63  139174.36  101124.43 
13.93  2.15  2.52  6476.44  28368.39  321.99  1876.84  9875.27  58258.87 
6.89  1.63  1.67  2289.03  5376.53  8.22  112.20  3922.75  9488.60 
14.49  1.48  1.61  1697.46  1987.65  41.29  70.16  2320.86  3365.03 
9.05  2.77  1.02  4117.01  4867.61  14.57  52.25  6626.11  9213.36 
6.95  1.48  1.29  718.91  3872.42  2.32  158.33  1115.90  9930.80 
37.99  0.08  1.20  1243.96  14292.60  16.23  11  11.52  1876.49  18632.57 
-24.43  0.46  0.37  10516.38  23199.80  388.06  803.25  24280.00  45261.38 
12.99  0.78  1.71  4923.25  21932.54  22.14  96.08  7601.91  29643.89 
27.95  0.97  1.73  1036.14  5107.24  3.43  23.40  1144.98  5681.19 
12.28  0.58  1.99  8828.23  66108.21  145.06  1806.25  13655.43  139060.77 
15.63  1.89  1.61  1279.38  4997.28  12.26  95.73  1878.43  7599.70 
8.98  1.16  1.74  397.69  796.97  0.10  0.72  752.72  1220.73 





































2  I .so 
5.48 
Svurce: EMDB. 
Nore: The first column under each heading refers to January 1989 and the second to December 1992. The (double) columns are: number of  stocks, level of  the IFC 
index (1984 = IOO), IFC PIE ratio, IFC P/BV ratio, IFC market capitalization, IFC value traded, total market capitalization, and exchange rate (LC/$).  The P/E ratios 
can be misleading in high inflation countries (such as Argentina and Brazil in the late 1980s, as the earnings are measured as the average flow over the past twelve 
months, and prices are taken at the end of the periods). Similarly, P/BV ratios can be misleading in a highly inflationary environment. 237  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Table 5.3  Statistic on the Index Rates of Return (1989-1992), by Country (annual 
percentage changes) 
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0.18  0.12 
0.60  0.92 
0.94  1.23 
-0.56  0.36 
I .64  5.19 
-0.17  1.59 
0.14  0.18 
-0.59  0.28 
1.83  4.01 
-0.18  0.93 
1.34  4.3 I 
1.12  I .46 
2.34  8.98 
0.06  -0.14 
0.24  -0.68 
1.61  2.83 
-0.02  -0.37 
0.62  1.15 
-2.98  13.54 





















Nore: The monthly rates are multiplied by 12 to obtain the yearly rates. The standard deviation is obtained 
by  multiplying the monthly standard deviation with the square root of  12. N  is the number of  months, 
Meanchg refers to the mean change in the rate of return, Stdchg to the standard deviation of the rate of 
return, Minchg and Maxchg to the minimum and maximum change in the rate of return, Skewchg to the 
skewness coefficient, Kurtchg to the kurtosis coefficient, and Autocorr to the first order autocorrelation. 
First observation for Indonesia and Zimbabwe is January 1990. 
requires running the following regressions. First, we project the rate of return 
of the domestic IFC market indexes,j, = 1, . .  . ,  K, on the rate of  return on a 
world portfolio index, here approximated by the Morgan Stanley Capital Inter- 
national (MSCI) world index (the net dividends reinvested series), to get the 
orthogonal component in the domestic index (note that all time subscripts are 
omitted)  : 
where R, is the rate of return on the index in market j,  Rw is the rate of return 
of the world index, and V,-,, is the component orthogonal to the projection of 
R, on Rw . 
We then regress the world rate of return on the various IFC indexes' rates of 
return to get the orthogonal components here: 
where Vw-j  is the component orthogonal to the projection of Rw  on R,. Table 5.4  Minimum and Maximum Values of Cross-Sectional  Values of Monthly Time Series of Rates of Return for All Stocks 
























































































































































































































































Note:  Avail is the nmber  of stocks for which data are available during the period. Lmean is the lowest mean rate of return for any stock in a market, and Hmean the 
highest rate of return. Lstd is the lowest standard deviation of  the rates of  return across all stocks in a given market, Hstd the highest. Lmin is the lowest minimum 
rate of  return across all stocks in a given market; Hmin is the highest minimum rate of  return in a given market. Similarly for Lmax and Hmax, the highest. Autolag 
is the first autocorrelation, with Lautolag the lowest and Hautolag the highest in a given market. No data on individual stock rate of return were available for Argentina. 239  The Effect of muity Barriers 
The Stehle test then involves two cross-section tests, using the orthogonal 
components of the regressions (1) and (2). Under full integration, the parame- 
ter on the slope coefficients (denoted here by  PiJJ  of the individual stocks' 
rates of return on the orthogonal component of the regression of the local index 
on the world portfolio should not be significantly different from zero. Under 
complete segmentation, the parameter on the slope coefficients (denoted here 
by  Pi,w-j)  of the individual stocks' rates of return on the orthogonal component 
of  the regression of  the world portfolio on the local index should be not be 
significantly different from zero. In other words, assuming complete integra- 
tion or complete segmentation, equation (3) or (4) should hold for the rate of 
return on stock i in marketj: 
(3) 
(4) 
Jw,)  =  YOJ  + YIJPiJ,w  + Y2.jPi,j-w 
m,)  = q0.j + %JPiJ  + 712JPi,w-j7 
where R,j  is the return on stock i in marketj,i = l,..Nj, where N,  is the number 
of  stocks in market j. Under complete integration, yz = 0 and q2 # 0, and 
under complete segmentation q2  = 0 and yz # 0. 
Since we  have actual rates of  return, we  need to decompose the rates of 
return in an expected component and an unexpected component. Under com- 
plete integration 
(5)  R,  = W,) + Pi,j,w[Rw  -  E(R,)I  + PiJ-w  V,-w + cij. 
Under complete segmentation 
(6)  Rjj  = E(RJ  + P,,[Rj -  E(R,)I  + Pi.w-j  Vw-j + 8i.y 
Substituting equation (3) into (5) and  (4) into (6) we  get two equations 
which give us the empirical model under market integration (7) and under seg- 
mentation (8), respectively: 
(7) 
(8) 
Rid = ~o,j(' -  Pi,J + ~ZjPij-w  + P,j,Jw + Pi,j-wV,-w  +  "ij 
Ri, = qo,j(l -  PJ  + q2jPi.w-j  + P$j  + Pi,,-jvw-j  + 'ij 
Estimating these equations using the two-pass approach often used in empir- 
ical studies of traditional asset pricing models (see Fama 1991) is not straight- 
forward here since the ps are measured with error-there  is thus an errors-in- 
the-variables problem-and  the cross-section equations (7) and (8) are biased. 
To overcome this problem, cross-section tests traditionally have been done us- 
ing portfolios of stocks, in the expectation that the formation of portfolios will 
reduce the measurement error (the Fama-Macbeth [1973] method). Because of 
the limited data we have here, this is difficult (there are few stocks for each 
country with complete data on rates of return, on average less than twenty). 
We therefore use the rates of return on the individual stocks directly. 
We  use the nonlinear, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, 
which is asymptotically efficient and equivalent to the maximum likelihood 240  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
estimation  (MLE)  method  (see,  further,  Gibbons  1980  and  1982).6 This 
method  is consistent,  but  may  not  have good  small  sample properties.  We 
therefore use all securities which are consistently available in a given market 
over the  1989-92  period. We estimate for each market N equations (N  being 
the number of  securities in the market) as a system of equations with cross- 
equation restrictions on the y and q  coefficients in each market and no restric- 
tions on the ps (except that they are constant over time). The estimation tech- 
nique allows for correction of heteroscedasticity across the stocks and exploits 
the contemporaneously correlated errors. The parameter estimates and other 
statistics are in table 5.5. 
The R2s for the  segmentation and integration tests (last column) vary be- 
tween 0.18 (Jordan) and 0.74 (Nigeria) and are of similar magnitude (by coun- 
try) for the two tests (reflecting  the fact that the two  systems are basically 
run with the same set of fundamental variables). The integration hypothesis is 
rejected at the 5 percent level for ten out of the sixteen countries for which we 
have consistent data.’ The segmentation hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 per- 
cent level for all countries and at the 10 percent level for only three countries 
(India, Korea, and the Philippines). For two countries, the segmentation test 
did not converge (Colombia and Malaysia). Combining the two tests, market 
integration can and market segmentation cannot be rejected (at the 5 percent 
level) for eight countries (Brazil, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philip- 
pines, Taiwan, and Thailand). For six countries neither market segmentation 
nor market integration can be rejected (Chile, India, Jordan, Nigeria, Venezu- 
ela, and Zimbabwe), possibly indicating a low power of our test. 
The results of these estimation techniques can be compared with the results 
for Canada-United  States: Jorion and Schwartz (1986) find strong evidence of 
market segmentation, and Mittoo (1992) finds evidence of market segmenta- 
tion for the pre-1981 period, but integration for the post-1981 period. For de- 
veloping  countries,  Enunza,  Losq,  and  Padmanabhan  (1992),  using  IFC 
EMDB data over the 1976-87  period, reject complete market integration for 
all eight developing countries they study and reject complete market segmenta- 
tion of five of these eight countries (Brazil, Chile, Greece, Korea, and Mexico). 
They conclude that “mild”  segmentation best describes the market structure 
for these five countries. Compared to their results, we find that relatively fewer 
countries are not integrated (ten out of sixteen compared to eight out of eight), 
but more are segmented (fourteen out of the fourteen markets which converged 
compared to their five out of eight). 
6. We use the SAS routine SYSNLIN (version 5.0) for the nonlinear seemingly unrelated regres- 
sion (NLSUR). Other approaches are the MLE method of  Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), 
the procedure outlined in  Gibbons (1980). and the oddeven instrumental variable approach of 
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986). We  did use the oddeven method but this method had a lower power 
as it could reject neither market segmentation nor integration for any of  the countries. 
7. Data for individual stock rates of  return are missing for Argentina for all years; for Turkey 
and Indonesia, data were only available since 1987 and 1990, respectively; for Portugal no stock 
has data available consistently for the 1989-92  period. Table 5.5  Slope Coefficients for the Integration and Segmentation Tests 
Integration  Segmentation 











































































































0.46  not reject 
0.40  not reject 
0.28  not reject 
0.29  not reject 
0.68  not reject 
0.47  not reject 
0.56  not reject 
0.19  not reject Table 5.5  (continued) 
Integration  Segmentation 
N  'yo.,  Y2.I  R2  I  T0.I  q2.1  R2  5 
Brazil  18  -0.002 
(0.799) 
Chile  22  0.0627 
(0.005) 
Colombia  20  0.0077 
(0.234) 
Mexico  21  0.0227 
(0.042) 
Venezuela  12  0.0100 
(0.479) 
Nigeria  14  1.196 
(0.808) 
Zimbabwe  10  O.OOO6 
(0.969) 
0.0375  0.45  reject 
(0.0001) 
-  .0024  0.37  not reject 
(0.877) 
0.0435  0.33  reject 
(0.0001) 
0.0466  0.32  reject 
(0.0001) 
0.0199  0.36  not reject 
(0.390) 
-0.914  0.74  not reject 
(0.807) 
0.0059  0.22  not reject 
(0.805) 













-8.798  0.45  not reject 
-2.020  0.40  not reject 
(0.977) 
(0.489) 
-6.748  0.32  not reject 
(0.927) 
0.940  0.36  not reject 
(0.199) 
-5.914  0.74  not reject 
-0.030  0.22  not reject 
(0.961) 
(0.176) 
Note:  Approximate  p-values (for the t-statistics) are in parentheses. In spite of using many different starting values for the parameters, and even after the maximum 
iterations were increased up to 2000 and the convergence criteria were raised to O.OOO1,  no convergence (NC) was obtained for Colombia and Malaysia for the 
segmentation test. R2s are obtained as one minus the ratio of sum of squared residual (totaled for all equations) over sum of squared totals (totaled for all equations). 243  The Effect of  Equity Barriers 
It is worth noting that the overall fit of both cross-section equation (5)  as 
well as (6) improves over time.* The fact that both the complete segmentation 
model as well as the complete integration model describe the cross-sectional 
behavior of returns better as time progresses is somewhat puzzling. A priori, 
we  expected that the integration model would have  performed better over 
time-as  countries opened up-and  the segmentation model worse. One ex- 
planation is that both equations essentially use the same set of  explanatory 
variables, world and local rates of return, and consequently that the behavior 
over time of the overall fit has to be similar. 
5.5  Barriers and the Investability Indexes 
This section provides some statistics  on the investability indexes. Barriers to 
access by foreigners are more severe for developing countries than for indus- 
trial countries. While many  developing countries have  liberalized in recent 
years, in the past many had-and  some still have-capital  controls affecting 
the general ability to invest in and repatriate capital out of  the host country, 
restrictions on foreign investment (e.g., restrictions on the general permissible 
share of  foreign ownership), and other sector or company-specific ownership 
restrictions. 
In addition to these legal barriers, other barriers likely limit foreigners’ ac- 
cess to these  market^.^ The IFC investability indexes are, however, only con- 
cerned with legal barriers. In particular, the investability indexes are compiled 
on the basis of information on type (andor changes) of identifiable barriers (in 
or out, ownership restrictions, remittance restrictions, otker foreign exchange 
restrictions,  restrictions  on capital structure,  etc.). Typically,  however, the index 
reflects the share of  stocks which can be held by  foreigners, that is, the 6- 
constraint. Indirect barriers are not incorporated in the index (even though the 
IFC categorizes the severity of these indirect barriers by market; see the IFC 
Emerging Markets Factbook, 1993). Appendix B describes the method used 
for creating the investability indexes and the restrictions in place as of the end 
of 1992 for some selected emerging markets. 
8. We estimate the cross-section  equations (5)  and (6) for every month during the period Decem- 
ber  1988-December  1992, where we use estimates of the various betas obtained from using the 
previous three years of data (instead of running it as systems with constant  betas). We then measure 
the degree of improvement over time in overall fit for each country through the correlations of the 
Ps  of the cross-section equations with an  index which runs  from one (first cross-section equation) 
to forty-nine (last cross-section equation). For both equations (5) and (6),  fourteen out of  the 
sixteen correlations are positive (six of which are significantly so at the 5 percent level). 
9. For example, there can be restrictions imposed on  investors  by  the home country (e.g., restric- 
tions on the share of foreign assets held by pension funds) and other regulatory and accounting 
standards in the home country. Also, indirect barriers may  exist, such as the efficiency of the 
domestic stock (and other financial) markets; the regulatory, accounting, enforcement, etc., stan- 
dards in  the host country; the  different forms of  sovereign  (or transfer) risk; and taxes (see 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1992) and other transaction costs. We do not analyze these restric- 
tions. 244  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
The investability indexes are available from December 1989, initially for ten 
of the twenty markets in the EMDB and later for eighteen. The investability 
indexes take on values between 0.0 (complete lack of  access by  foreigners) 
and  1.0 (complete access). Table  5.6  provides information (the number of 
stocks, the mean level, the standard deviation, the range, and the skewness of 
the indexes)  on  the  cross-sectional distributions of  the  investability index 
within a given country, at different points in time. Figure 5.1 provides the time- 
series plots for the mean and cross-sectional standard deviation for the seven 
countries which have consistent data for the investability index and the stock 
rates of return since 1989 (Chile had missing data for 199  1 and thus could not 
be plotted). As can be observed from the figure and also by  comparing the 
three panels of table 5.6, there are sharp movements over time in the degree to 
which foreigners can access these markets. For Mexico, for example, the index 
goes up from an average of 0.10 in January 1989 to 0.61 at the end of  1992 
and further to 0.80 in March 1993. Similarly, the average for Brazil goes up 
from 0.18 to 0.53. Except for Malaysia, the cross-sectional mean is lower in 
Asia, an indication that few markets in this region have opened up. 
The cross-sectional standard deviation of the index at the end of 1992 varies 
greatly, from 0.00 for Taiwan to 0.51 for Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela. In 
general, the cross-sectional standard deviation is lower in Asia (even though 
less so for Pakistan, the Philippines, and Malaysia), an indication that these 
countries have mostly marketwide, not sector- or stock-specific restrictions. 
The time-series plots of the cross-section variation and table 5.7 show that 
European and Latin American countries have seen the greatest variation over 
time in the mean index (the standard deviation of the mean index [Stdmn] in 
table 5.7 is higher for European countries, except Jordan, and Latin American 
countries, except Venezuela). Asian  countries have the least variation over 
time. Also taking into account the low cross-sectional variation in Asian coun- 
tries, this reflects that those Asian countries which opened up during this pe- 
riod did so in a marketwide fashion. Altogether there are four markets which 
have little time-series variation in access (i.e., for which in table 5.7 the Stdmn 
5  0.04), but a reasonable cross-sectional variation (i.e., for which, according 
to table 5.6, the Std 2 0.16 at any point in time and for which we have complete 
data on rates of return and investability indexes): Jordan, Malaysia, the Philip- 
pines, and Thailand. Of these four, Jordan has the lowest mean index, 0.09 at 
the end of 1992. 
5.6  Tests of the Relationship between the Investability Indexes, P/E 
Ratios, and Rates of Return 
So far, we have found evidence of market segmentation for about ten mar- 
kets. We now proceed to more formally incorporate barriers in our empirical 
tests, using the models of Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Stulz and Was- 
serfallen (1992), and the application of  these models by  Bailey and Jagtiani 245  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Table 5.6  Cross-Sectional  Analysis of the Investability Index for Each Country 
in January 1989, June 1990, and December 1992 
Number of  Mean  Standard  Range 









































890  1 
890  1 
890  I 
890  1 
890  1 
890  1 
8901 
890  1 





















































































































































0.5  1 
0.49 
0.5  1 
1  .00 
1  .oo 
1 .00 
1  .oo 
0.49 




1  .oo 
1 .oo 
1  .00 





1  .oo 
0.50 
0.25 






1  .oo 
1  .oo 
0.05 
0.50 




1  .oo 
1  .oo 
0.25 
1  .oo 
1  .00 
1  .00 































I .7 1783 
0.56336 
-  1.59749 






Note: Statistics provide the cross-sectional distribution of the investability index at a given point 
in time. The cross-sectional minimum is 0.0 in all markets. No data were available for Nigeria 
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Table 5.7  Time-Series  Analysis of the Crass-Sectional Mean of the Investability 
Indexes 









































































Argentina  52  0.61  0.15  0.33  0.79 
Brazil  52  0.30  0.18  0.09  0.54 
Chile  40  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.14 
C  o  1  om  b  i  a  26  0.38  0.12  0.25  0.50 
Mexico  52  0.47  0.21  0.10  0.80 
Venezuela  39  0.41  0.03  0.3  1  0.44 
Nore: The statistics apply to the time series of  the mean value of the investability index for a given 
market. Chile has missing data for 1991. Stdmn refers to the standard deviation of the mean index, 
Minmn to the minimum of the mean index. and Maxmn to the maximum of the mean index. 
(1992). We  start with the assumption that the world and the emerging country 
have the same numeraire (dollars) so that exchange risk is not priced. Conse- 
quently, we focus on the dollar rates of  return. We  further assume that the 
residents of the emerging countries have full access to foreign financial mar- 
kets and foreign stocks. The high levels of  flight capital observed for many 
developing countries indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. Foreigners 
are, however, restricted from full access to the emerging markets and can invest 
only up to a fraction 6 measured by the investability index. 
When the &constraint is binding, two prices for the same security will oc- 
cur: a “domestic” price for that share of the stock which can only be held by 
domestic residents, and a “foreign” price for the share of the stock which can 
be held by both foreigners and domestic residents. Compared to a situation 
with no restrictions, a discount can arise for the domestic price and a premium 
for the foreign price. The ratio of foreign to domestic prices will, among oth- 
ers, depend on the supply of both classes of  shares, relative to domestic and 
foreign investors’ wealth. 
Apart from the fact whether the constraint on ownership is binding on the 
foreigners-which  we assume it is-the  degree to which the domestic market 
offers unique risk-return characteristics from a world capital market point of 
view plays an important role in determining the existence and size of the dis- 248  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
count and premium. If the domestic market can be mimicked perfectly using 
world assets, then foreigners will not be willing to pay a premium for emerging 
markets’ stocks. And if domestic residents can lay off the risk of their emerg- 
ing market stocks through positions in stocks available in the world capital 
markets, then they do not require a discount on emerging market stocks, even 
if they are forced to hold them because of the 
We  test these relationships using individual stocks’ P/E ratios and rates of 
return for the seven countries for which we have consistent data on returns and 
investability indexes.” Since we are not studying unrestricted and restricted 
shares of  the same firm, but rather shares of  individual firms which vary in 
their degree of restrictiveness, we cannot calculate the ratio of foreign to do- 
mestic prices here.’*  However, we can study the price-earning ratio of a stock. 
Similarly, we can use domestic rates of return (instead of  the difference be- 
tween the returns to foreign and domestic shareholders). 
We  estimate mimicking portfolios on the basis of  the IFC index for the 
emerging market and the MSCI indexes for thirteen industrial countries. Spe- 
cifically, the mimicking portfolios are created through ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions of (the rates of return on) the indexes on (the rates of return 
on) the thirteen MSCI indexes. We  then use the predicted values from this 
regression as the rates of return on the mimicking p~rtfolio.’~  As in Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1992) and Bailey and Jagtiani (1992), we  also include in the 
estimations a size (or supply) variable, here taken as the log of  the market 
capitalization of  each stock, My,,.  Finally, we use actual instead of expected 
P/E ratios or returns. 
We  thus model the P/E ratio, or alternatively, the (excess) rate of return of 
domestic stock i in marketj, as 
(9) 
where S,, indicates the share foreigners can buy of a particular stock i at time 
t (the investability index), Pi,, is the slope coefficient of stock i on the world 
10. Notice that this approach resembles segmentatiodintegration tests where the residual of a 
projection of the local return on the world return (and vice versa) was used. Here the local index 
is mimicked more generally using (in principle) all worldwide traded assets. Since barriers and 
associated “mispricing” of individual securities can affect the overall domestic stock market, (an- 
nouncements of) barriers on individual securities can lead to a marketwide effect through “spill- 
over” effects (see, further, Eun, Claessens, and Jun  1993). We do not attempt to control for these 
effects. 
11. The results for seven other countries are available upon request. 
12. Even though we have some stocks of the same firm (e.g., Telmex shares A, B, C, and L) 
which differ in degree of investability, the sample of such stocks is small. Other foreign prices are 
available in the form of country-fund and ADR prices. For an analysis of country-fund prices, see 
Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (chap. 8 in this volume) and Diwan, Emnza, and Senbet 
(1993a, 1993b). 
13. The mimicking is, as expected, generally poor as these markets have a low correlation with 
markets of industrial countries. The residual domestic risks are consequently quite large. 249  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
portfolio (here the MSCI world index), @,,  is the slope coefficient of stock i 
on the mimicking portfolio A, p,, is the slope coefficient of stock i on the local 
market indexj  (note that the as are not stock specific), and where the subscript 
t for the @-coefficients  indicates that these are estimates updated every month 
using the previous three years of data. The difference between p,,  and @,,  rep- 
resents the domestic risk that cannot be hedged through positions in foreign 
assets. When there is no residual risk to bear, p,,, -  p,,,  = 0 and the world 
CAPM prevails. To estimate the betas, we regress the rates of return during the 
three-year period preceding the date on the respective indexes. 
depend on the relative risk aversion, the wealth of both 
foreign  and  domestic  investors,  and  the  total  supply  of  restricted  and  un- 
restricted  shares. The prior is, when the access constraint is binding, that the 
coefficients  al,l  are positive  (an increase in 6 relaxes the foreign constraint, 
decreases the required rate of return, and increases the P/E ratio). The coeffi- 
cients a2,r  represent the world market price of risk and are expected to be nega- 
tive. The coefficients aj,t  are expected to be negative as a decrease in the ability 
to mimic local risk increases the required rate of return  and lowers the P/E 
ratio. Finally, ad,,  are expected to be positive as an increase in the supply of 
assets, keeping liquidity constant, raises the required rate of return and lowers 
the P/E ratio. When using the rate of return as the dependent variable, the signs 
of the a-coefficients are expected to take the opposite value. 
We do not impose time-series restrictions on the coefficients a0,,-a4.,  for 
each  market,  that  is,  we  do not  use  the  SUR  technique  we  used  for the 
integrationkegmentation  tests. Rather we employ the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
methodology  where we estimate a separate cross-section equation  for each 
month in the  1989-92  period for each market and then  calculate averages, 
standard deviation, etc., of the time series of the slope  coefficient^.'^ 
The results for the P/E ratio alone are in the first panel of table 5.8, which 
reports  the  means  of  the  slope  coefficients, the  t-value  for the  time-series 
means, and the means of  the individual t-values. The other panels cover the 
results when  we include different combinations of the other right-hand-side 
variables. The results for the rates of return are in table 5.9. 
The results for regressions of the P/E ratios on the index alone confirm the 
notion that the P/E ratio is positively related to the degree of access by foreign- 
ers, suggesting that barriers to access have a negative  impact on prices. As 
measured by the t-value for the mean slope coefficient, for all seven countries, 
the mean slope is significantly positive (with Brazil marginally). When includ- 
ing other explanatory variables, we find that the positive sign for 6 is robust to 
the inclusion of the world beta and the degree of international spanning of the 
The coefficients 
14. The main reason we use the Fama-MacBeth methodology is that equation (9) is not formally 
derived from any rate of return generating process. As a result, the restrictions which would need 
to be imposed on the coefficients in an SUR are unclear and the more traditional Fama-Macbeth 























40.45  2.65 
57.62  3.45 
5.1  3.83 
28.31  3.06 
125.87  3.26 
9.18  1.94 
6.19  4.13 
53.17  1.71 
-52.22  -3.18 
-25.73  -8.52 
140.18  1.85 
4.2  1.02 
7.33  2.17 
11.69  3.6 
71.11  1.62 
10.66  1.89 
-9.53  -5.89 
288.19  1.64 
26.31  2.24 
10.58  2.33 






















37.44  0.78  0.23 
54.88  2.87  -0.23 
10.99  9.02  1.44 
109.3  -1.63  -0.71 
11.74  3.41  0.21 
-0.33  -0.48  -0.39 
-  1.95  -0.76  0 
-17.9  -0.3  0.37 
-82.77  -3.05  -1.39 
11.9  7.71  1.94 
236.21  1.56  -1.02 
3.28  0.4  -0.45 
-3.25  -4.92  -1.02 






















-2.3  -0.15  -0.17 
-38.41  -2.4  0.04 
-13.47  -7.35  -0.47 
-65.12  -1.55  0.28 
43.6  4.53  0.45 
-13.99  -2.27  -0.93 
10.46  2.67  0 
66.62  1.52  -0.08 
4.2  1.13  0.04 
-18.4  -6.17  -0.58 
370  1.71  0.35 
16.97  1.82  -0.02 
10.43  2.22  0.67 
12.31  4.06  0.57 
22.94  0.97  -0.13 
17.06  2.33  0.28 
-27.16  -8.59  -1.17 
-35.86  -0.6  0.35 
51.39  4.54  0.54 
-0.23  -0.07  -0.64 















0.34  0.37 
2.1  -0.75 
4.36  0.41 
-1.68  -1.21 
3.03  0.21 
-3.36  -0.79 
-1.07  -0.11 
0.75  0.18 
2.97  0.07 
10.11  1.61 
-0.78  -0.45 
4.63  0.34 
-0.01  -0.29 
-0.8  -0.18 
-16.31  -2.73  0.31 
0.77  0.31  -0.77 
1.29  4.6  0.55 
60.61  1.81  0.17 
-6.58  -5.34  -0.51 
3.15  4.37  1.81 
0.07  0.05  0.69 
-10.28  -0.16  0.5 1 
-77.16  -3.04  -1.22, 
9.38  6.2  1.11 
240.34  1.6  -1.06 
14.94  1.29  -0.25 
-3.92  -6.26  -1.39 
-5.56  -1.7  -0.45 
-7.15  -1.38  0.4 
-25.4  -3.32  -0.87 
1.68  7.89  0.96 
51.08  1.71  0.16 
-9.28  -5.09  -0.57 
2.29  7.1  2.01 




























0.71  -0.19 
3.12  0.32 
1.59  0.02 
4.07  0.49 
0.84  -0.34 
2.91  0.09 
0.97  -0.16 
-5.92  -0.4 
3.06  0.47 
-6.18  -0.71 
1.68  0.06 
3.51  0.53 
0.91  -0.19 
2.93  0.23 






-  5.46 
14.46  0.31  0.34  -10.87 
32.96  2.62  -0.41  -74.07 
6.46  4.37  0.57  8.23 
-53.95  -1.24  -0.75  227.95 
37.82  3.68  0.34  16.36 
-1.37  -2.13  -0.7  -3.02 







































































Note:  MN  stands for the time-series mean of  the cross-sectional regression coefficients. Std represents the standard deviation of  the cross- 
sectional regression coefficients. T stands for the t-value of the mean of the time-series of  coefficients, i.e., mean*sqrt(n)/std. MN T stands for 
the mean of the t-values of  the individual cross-sectional regressions. We use stocks with complete observations from 1/86 through 12/92. 6 
stands for the investability index. P,  are world betas. p,  are the betas against the local index and Pa  are the betas from the mimicking portfolios. 
MV are one-month lagged log market values. For the number of stocks, see table 5.6 on the investability index. Results are similar when using 
local betas and betas from mimicking portfolios separately rather than taking the difference between them. Table 5.9  Time-Series Summary of Cross-Sectional  Regressions of Rates of Return against Investability Index 
(1989-1992) 























0.02  1.77  0.13 
0.02  1.7  0.35 
0.13  4.28  0.48 
0.03  2.3  0.55 
-0.03  -2.05  -0.2 
0.02  0.68  0.14 
0.01  1.08  0.1 
0.02  1.48  0.09  -0.01  -0.7  -0.16 
0.02  1.94  0.42  0  -0.1  -0.08 
0.1  2.82  0.44  -0.02  -0.69  -0.12 
0.03  2.2  0.59  0  0.35  0.18 
-0.04  -1.98  -0.22  0.03  1.86  0.25 
0  -0.08  -0.01  -0.03  -2.08  -0.28 
0.01  0.91  0.06  0.01  1.01  0.27 
0.02  1.65  0.12 
0.02  2  0.41 
0.12  3.19  0.44 
0.02  1.82  0.6 
-0.02  -1.09  -0.16 
0.04  0.89  0.08 
0.02  1.41  0.16 
0.0  1  0.91  0.02 
-0.01  -0.98  -0.34 
0  -0.14  0 
-0.01  -0.86  -0.11 
0.03  1.56  0.02 
-0.01  -0.6  -0.05 
-0.01  -1.65  -0.3 Table 5.9  (continued) 



















0.01  1.49 
0.03  2.69 
0.13  3.83 
0.03  2.02 
0  0.06 
0.02  0.57 
0  -0.36 
0.02  1.46 
0.03  2.32 
0.1  2.28 
0.03  1.75 
-0.02  -1.38 
0.02  0.45 
0.01  0.96 
0.01  1.27 
0.04  2.97 
0.09  2.22 



















0  -0.11 
-0.01  -0.69 
-0.03  -0.95 
0.05  3.25 
-0.03  -2.26 
0.02  1.26 
0  -0.01 
0.01  0.67 
-0.01  -0.33 
0.02  1.14 


























0.69  -0.02 
-0.15  -0.21 
0.32  -0.08 
-0.58  -0.01 
2.61  0.2 
-1.51  -0.2 


























-0.31 Jordan  0.02  0.67  0.09  0.04  2.05  0.34 
Brazil  -0.01  -0.23  -0.06  -0.03  -1.97  -0.28 
Mexico  -0.01  -0.55  -0.15  0.02  1.08  0.31 
Malaysia  0.01  1.34  0.12 
Philippines  0.03  3.03  0.37 
Thailand  0.11  2.79  0.4 
Greece  0.03  2.02  0.64 
Jordan  -0.01  -0.19  0.06 
Brazil  -0.03  -0.77  -0.07 
Mexico  0  -0.14  -0.06 
Malaysia  0.01  1.24  0.1  0  0.37  0.01 
Philippines  0.04  3.36  0.45  0  0.14  -0.06 
Thailand  0.04  0.72  0.2  0.01  0.31  0 
Greece  0.04  2.35  0.67  0.01  0.35  0.19 
Jordan  0.01  0.4  0.15  0.06  3.17  0.37 
Brazil  -0.01  -0.36  -0.06  -0.02  -1.85  -0.12 
Mexico  -0.01  -0.49  -0.11  0.02  1.31  0.39 
0.02 
-0.01 



























































































Note: MN stands for the time-series mean of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. Std represents the standard deviation of  the cross- 
sectional regression coefficients. T stands for the t-value of the mean of the times-series of coefficients, it., mean*sqrt(n)/std. MN T 
stands for the mean of  the f-values of the individual cross-sectional regressions. We  use stocks with complete observations from 1/86 
through 12/92. 6 stands for the investability index. p,  are world betas. p,  are the betas against the local index and pa  are the betas from 
the mimicking portfolios. MV are one-month lagged log market values. For the number of  stocks, see table 5.6 on the investability index. 
Results are similar when using local betas and betas from mimicking portfolios separately rather than taking the difference between them. 256  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
domestic market for four markets. Only for Jordan and Mexico is the positive 
sign for 6 maintained  across all regression specifications. For the other coun- 
tries the sign for 6 at times turns negative, for example, when including the 
lagged (log) market value, the third panel. For Jordan, the signs for the other 
explanatory variables are not always as expected, for example, several of the 
ps have positive signs. In the case of Mexico, the signs for the ps are, as hy- 
pothesized, all negative (e.g., see the very last line of table 5.8). 
The t-values for the time-series means show that there are quite a number 
of significant coefficients. For example, for the regression which includes all 
explanatory variables (the last panel of table 5.8),  fourteen out of twenty-eight 
coefficients are significant on the basis of the t-values for the mean (the mean 
of the individual t-values shows, however, that many of the individual regres- 
sion coefficients were insignificant). But the signs are often not as expected. 
For the rates of return, Jordan is the only country which has the expected 
negative sign for 6 (first panel, table 5.9). This negative sign is robust, but loses 
significance, when including p,  and p,  -  pcz,  which themselves also have the 
expected positive and often significant  signs. The negative sign for 6 disap- 
pears when the lagged (log) market value is included. For none of the other 
markets do we find that returns are negatively related  to the investability in- 
dexes in a consistent fashion. 
The degree to which the model explains the cross-section variation in the 
P/E-ratios  and rates  of  return  varies greatly across equations  and countries. 
While in general we have low explanatory power, with the time-series mean of 
the adjusted R2s mostly reaching less than 10 percent, at times the mean ad- 
justed R2  reaches 70 to 80 percent (figures are not reported). 
Our findings may be better understood by referring back to figure 5.1. This 
figure showed that there is much erratic behavior in the investability indexes, 
with large swings from month to month for some countries; for example, for 
Greece in late 1990 the mean index falls in one month from 0.77 to 0.57 and 
then goes back up to 0.75, casting some doubt on the manner in which these 
data were constructed. More important, as was noted before, only for Jordan 
is the mean index stable and low, while at the same displaying a relatively large 
cross-sectional variation. 
The behavior of the indexes may explain why we only find consistent results 
for both P/E ratios and rates of return for Jordan. For three of the four countries 
where the investability index was stable while still displaying relatively large 
cross-sectional variation, the access constraint likely did not bind (Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand). This implies one would not expect a cross- 
sectional relationship between returns and the indexes. For the other countries, 
the investability  indexes were not  stable (the mean  increased for Brazil  and 
Mexico and behaved erraticly for Greece). This could imply that time-series 
effects (of opening up or closing of  the markets, or of data problems) con- 
founded the cross-sectional relationship between returns and the investability 
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the ex ante rates of return. A positive relationship between the P/E ratio and 
the investability indexes could still be maintained if countries opened up (e.g., 
Brazil and Mexico), however, since then both the cross-sectional and time- 
series effects would go the same way. 
To  control for the time-series effects of marketwide opening up, we stan- 
dardize the P/E ratio of  each stock in a given market by  dividing it by  the 
market-average P/E ratio. In this way, we control for changes in the P/E ratio 
of each stock for marketwide developments which may be related to the open- 
ing up of  the market. Admittedly, this is a crude way of proxying for events 
which affect a particular stock’s P/E ratio over time, but it should provide some 
indication of  how robust our results are to the time-series behavior of  the 
P/E ratios. 
The results are reported in table 5.10. Comparing the coefficients in table 
5.10 with those of table 5.8, we find that the cross-sectional relationship be- 
tween a stock’s P/E ratio and its 6 is robust to this standardization. While, as 
expected, the slope coefficients drop significantly, the t-values are not affected. 
If  anything, the cross-sectional effect of  6 on the P/E ratio is significant at 
higher levels than in table 5.8. By multiplying the slope coefficients with the 
mean level of 6 (from table 5.7),  the relative sensitivity of a stock’s P/E ratio 
with respect to 6 can be compared across countries. Excluding Thailand (which 
has a very low slope coefficient), the mean sensitivity is 0.91, with a standard 
deviation of only 0.44,  indicating some evidence of a common pattern. 
We  also perform a second robustness test. This involves controlling for the 
stocks’ industry (sector).15  Our previous results may be capturing differences 
in P/E ratios by industry to the extent that foreign ownership restrictions differ 
systematically by industry. Since we often have a limited number of stocks for 
each country, we cannot control for each industry without running out a de- 
grees of  freedom. We  therefore classify stocks in two groups: nonbank and 
bank.  Ownership restrictions appear to differ most  systematically between 
these two groups. We  perform this second robustness test for two countries, 
Malaysia and Brazil. Malaysia has twenty-three stocks in nonbank and six in 
bank. The nonbank group has a much higher 6 (100 percent) than the bank 
group (30 percent): the P/E ratio for nonbank is on average about twice as high 
as the P/E ratio of the bank stocks. Average rates of return do not differ be- 
tween the two groups. Brazil has fifteen stocks in nonbank and only three in 
bank. The P/E ratio for nonbank is on average slightly higher than that of bank, 
but average rates of return do not differ between the two groups. 
The results of  similar regressions as in tables 5.8-5.10  but now  with a 
dummy added for sector (nonbank = 0, bank = 1) are reported in table 5.11. 
As can be observed, for both countries and for the P/E ratio as well as for the 
rate of  return equations, the sector dummies have the right (negative) sign, 
indicating that the industry classification affects a stock’s P/E ratio. For Malay- 
15. We are grateful to Donald Lessard for suggesting this extension. Table 5.10  Time-Series Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions of Standardized PriceEarnings Ratio (P/E)  against 
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Note: MN stands for the time-series mean of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. T stands for the t-value of  the mean of the times- 
series of coefficients, i.e., mean*sqrt(n)/std. MN T stands for the mean of the r-values of the individual cross-sectional regressions. We use 
stocks with complete observations from 1/86 through 12/92. 6 stands for the investability index. p,  are world betas. p,  are the betas against 
the local index and P, are the betas from the mimicking portfolios. MV are one-month lagged log market values. For the number of stocks, 
see table 5.6 on the investability index. Table 5.11  Time-Series Summary of Cross-Sectional Regressions of PricelEarnings 
Ratio (P/E) and Rates of Return against Investability Index and Sector 
Dummy (1989-1992) 
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Nore: MN stands for the time-series mean of  the cross-sectional regression coefficients. T stands for the 
t-value of the mean of the times-series of coefficients, i.e., mean*sqrt(n)/std. We use stocks with complete 
observations from 1/86 through 12/92. 8 stands for the investability index. p,  are world betas. p,  are the 
betas against the local index and pa are the betas from the mimicking portfolios. MV are one-month 
lagged log market values. SEC stands for the sectoral dummy. For the number of stocks, see table 5.6 on 
the investability index. Results are similar when using local betas and betas from mimicking portfolios 
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sia, however, the dummies are never significant, while for Brazil only three out 
of eight are significant in the case of the P/E regressions and none for the rates 
of  return regressions. (Note, however, that there are only three stocks in the 
Brazil bank group.) Introducing the sector dummy does affect the other slope 
coefficients, however. In particular, for Malaysia the t-statistics for 6 become 
insignificant for almost all specifications. For Brazil, on the other hand, t- 
statistics often improve. For Malaysia, this raises the possibility that the regres- 
sions on the PE  ratio on 6 without sector dummy are misspecified because of 
multicollinearity between 6 and sector (i.e., sector-specific factors other than 
6 determine a stock‘s P/E ratio in such a way that high 6 sectors end up with 
high P/E ratios and vice versa). As we use no factors other than 6 and sector 
dummy to control for a stock’s P/E  ratio, we cannot determine conclusively 
either way whether it is the sector or the level of 6 which is driving the relation- 
ship between 6 and the P/E ratio. In the case of Brazil, there is no evidence of 
a coincidence between the industry sector of a stock and its 6. 
The negative results for the rates of  return are consistent with  Bekaert 
(1993).  He finds that there is not a significant relationship between ownership 
restrictions and the integration of an emerging market with world markets. He 
conjectures that ownership restrictions are not binding or are being circum- 
vented. 
5.7  Conclusions 
Tests of market integration using the Stehle (1977) model, employing non- 
linear, seemingly unrelated regressions (equivalent to the MLE), reject the 
market integration hypothesis for most and fail to reject segmentation for all. 
In particular, we find that over this period Brazil, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Paki- 
stan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand are segmented from international 
markets. 
We have evidence that the degree of investability affects P/E ratios for seven 
countries in the expected way. When including other explanatory variables, we 
find this result to be robust for four markets to the inclusion of the two addi- 
tional explanatory variables, and for two, Jordan and Mexico, when including 
three additional variables. It is also robust to the standardization of  the P/E 
ratios. When using rates of return, we only find the expected results for Jordan. 
Our weak results for the rates of return are likely because we cover time- 
series as well as cross-section effects. Without any change in access, that is, 
on a cross-sectional basis, one would expect stocks which are more accessible 
to have lower return. However, many markets have opened up and as a result 
stock prices have increased, implying that ex post returns have been high (even 
though expected returns may have  declined). This implies that on a cross- 
sectional basis one may not find a negative relationship between a stock’s re- 
turn and its investability index. The other possibility, of  course, is that the 
CAPM is not the right model to use. 263  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Our results indicate two possible avenues for improvements: one, we should 
attempt to keep the degree of  access over time constant; and two, to expand 
the model to test for the importance of the investability indexes in explaining 
rate of return behavior. This is left for future research. 
Appendix A 
General Criteria  for Inclusion in the IFC IndexeP 
The IFC selects stocks for inclusion in the indexes on the basis of three criteria: 
size, liquidity, and industry. The indexes include the largest and most actively 
traded stocks in each market, with a target index total representing the top 60 
percent of total market capitalization at the end of each year and, as a second 
step, the top 60 percent of total trading value during each year. Size is mea- 
sured by market capitalization; liquidity is the total value of shares traded dur- 
ing the year. 
Only stocks that are listed on one of the major exchanges in the emerging 
markets are included in the index. The index will not include stocks whose 
issuing company is headquartered in an emerging market but listed only on 
foreign markets. 
If several stocks meet the liquidity and size criteria, but only one or two are 
needed, the IFC selects the stocks that represent industries that are not yet well 
represented in the IFC index. 
In a few instances, particularly where multiple classes of stocks are common 
(e.g., Brazil and Mexico), the IFC may include in the IFC index more than one 
class of stock for the same company even though they are not necessarily ac- 
tively traded. The purpose is to give a balanced view of  the capitalization of 
companies that have other classes of stock that are actively traded. 
Stock market “float” (i.e., the amount of  issued stock held by the general 
public and generally assumed to be available for trading) is not a consideration 
in weighing the indexes, due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information 
in a timely manner. 
16. Appendix A and appendix B are copied from the IFC methodology notes. 264  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
Appendix B 
Criteria Used by the IFC for the Investable 
Indexes and Restrictions on Foreign Investors 
in Selected Countries 
Criteria Used by the IFC for the Investable Indexes 
As a first screen, stocks are included in the investable indexes if they are in the 
global index and are available for purchase by nonresident investment institu- 
tions to some degree; the degree is determined by national laws and by com- 
pany statutes. Governments and companies impose a variety of restrictions on 
foreign ownership,  which may also differ by  sector.  In  addition, individual 
firms may restrict foreign ownership of (certain classes of) shares. Several ex- 
amples are shown here; appendix B summarizes the restrictions in effect at the 
end of  1992 for some selected markets. 
General national limits, such as “foreigners as a group may not own more 
than 10 percent of any company”; 
Special class of shares, such as A and B class shares in the Philippines. 
The two are equivalent except that foreigners may not own A class 
shares: 
Sector restrictions, most commonly used  to limit foreign ownership of 
financial institutions, energy producers, utilities, and the media; 
Single foreign holder  limitations on general classes of  shares, such as 
Brazil’s “no more than 5 percent of the voting classes, nor more than 
20 percent of aggregate capital”  or Colombia’s  10 percent  limit per 
investor. The IFC rule in this regard is to use the aggregate that foreign 
investors as a whole may acquire; 
Example: In Colombia, foreigners may own 100 percent of most compa- 
nies, although no single foreigner may own more than 10 percent. The 
investable market capitalization would be considered as 100 percent; 
“Foreign board” adjuncts to the main stock exchange, where foreign in- 
vestors may trade listed stocks among themselves, assuring that trades 
conducted there will not cause the foreign ownership content to exceed 
maximum permitted level; 
Prohibitions on individual foreign investors while permitting multiple for- 
eign mutual funds, if they meet certain criteria, such as minimum fund 
size and experience. The IFC rule in this regard is to consider the mar- 
ket as open as it is to authorized investors, using the “aggregate inves- 
tor” rule noted above for individual stock investability factors; 
Company statutes that impose limits that differ from national law in some 
markets. In those case, the IFC uses the most restrictive limit; 265  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Example: The national limit is 49 percent, but a company’s articles of 
incorporation set a limit of 25 percent. The IFC would use a weight of 
25 percent; 
National limits on the aggregate permitted foreign investment. For ex- 
ample, Taiwan set a ceiling of US$2.5 billion on foreign inflows when 
it opened its stock market in January 1991. At the end of  1992, this 
represented about 2.5 percent of total Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
capitalization. In this case, the IFC would apply the relative shares of 
the available stocks within the market against the aggregate limit. 
Example: The national limit in a market is $1 billion, and the investable 
index in the market consists of two stocks, XYZ Inc. and ABC Corp., 
which have available market capitalizations  of $2 billion and $500 mil- 
lion, respectively. In the absence of the aggregate limit, the investable 
index would use $2 billion and $500 million as the available market 
capitalization. 
However, these amounts would exceed the limit, and the IFC would apply 
the relative share approach: two stocks represent 80 percent and 20 
percent of the available market capitalization, so the investable index 
would use $800 million and $200 million as the two stocks’ “available” 
market capitalization. 
For the calculation of the various IFC price and rate of return indexes, the 
investable market capitalization of each stock is used for its weight in the index 
instead of the stock’s total market capitalization. 
Example: XYZ, Ltd. has a total market capitalization  of $100 million but 
national law prohibits foreign ownership of more than 49 percent of a 
company. The IFC global index would use the full $100 million as the 
stock’s market capitalization  while the investable index would use only 
$49 million. 
To take concerns regrading illiquidity or relatively small market capitaliza- 
tions into account, the IFC excludes stocks from the investable index if 
1. trading value for the year totals less than $10 million, using total trading 
value unweighted for foreign access. 
2. the investable market capitalization  is less than $25 million. An  exception 
occurs when the investable capitalization is small but the trading is large. The 
IFC will not exclude a stock if the value traded exceeds $100 million for the 
year, regardless of the stock’s investable capitalization. 
Example: A stock in Korea has a total capitalization of $240 million and 
trading totaling $1,300 million for the year. With the 10 percent limit 
currently in effect in Korea, the investable capitalization is only $24 
million. It is clearly an accessible, large, and liquid stock, and foreign- 
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In rare cases, the selection screens could produce fewer than five stocks in 
an investable market, which is insufficient for an index. If  that happens, the 
IFC will select as many stocks as needed to reach the minimum of five stocks, 
using investable capitalization ranked in decreasing order by  size. 
Chile 
Restrictions on Foreign Investors at the End of 1992 
in Selected Countries 
Argentina 
Brazil 
The market is considered generally 100 percent investable; 
some corporate statute limitations apply. 
The market is considered generally investable; since May 
1991 foreign institutions may own up to 49 percent of voting 
common stock and  100 percent of  nonvoting participating 
preferred stock. Some corporate statute limitations (e.g., Pe- 
trobras common are off-limits) apply. 
Foreign portfolio investment is considered to enter Chile 
through the 1987 Law of 18657 regarding foreign capital in- 
vestment funds, which limits aggregate foreign ownership to 
25 percent of a listed company’s shares. 
The market is considered 100 percent investable from Febru- 
ary 1, 1991. 
The market is generally 100 percent investable. 
A press note issued by the Ministry of Finance of the govern- 
ment of  India on September 14, 1992, announced that for- 
eign institutional investors (FIIs) could henceforth invest in 
all listed securities in both primary and secondary markets. 
FIIs are required to  register with  the Securities and Ex- 
change Board of  India before making any investment. The 
market  is effectively considered open from  November  1, 
1992. 
Investments are subject to a ceiling of 24 percent of issued 
share capital for the total holdings of all registered FIIs and 
5 percent for the holding of a single FII in any one company. 
The ceiling includes the conversion of fully and partly con- 
vertible debentures issued by  the company. 
Until December 1987, the market was closed to foreign in- 
vestment. In December 1987, the government introduced de- 
regulation  measures  that  allowed  foreigners  to  purchase 
shares in eight nonjoint venture companies. On September 
16, 1989, the minister of finance of the Republic of Indone- 
sia issued Decree Number 1055/KMK.O13/1989,  which al- 
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Jordan 
Korea 
nies’  listed  shares, including foreign joint  ventures  but 
excluding banks. The Bank Act, 1992, enacted on October 
30, 1992, allowed foreigners to invest in up to 49 percent of 
the listed shares in three categories of banks-private  na- 
tional, state, and joint foreign. Currently only private na- 
tional banks are listed. 
In a few markets, such as Indonesia, companies do not list 
all the shares outstanding. For its indexes, the IFC counts 
only the shares listed at the stock exchange. 
The market is considered generally 49 percent investable. 
Since January  1,  1992,  authorized foreign investors have 
been allowed to acquire up to 10 percent of  the capital of 
listed companies; some corporate statute limitations apply 
(e.g., POSCO & KEPCO, 8 percent, and some are permitted 
up to 25 percent). The 10 percent limit applies separately to 
common and preferred stock. Under the revised regulations 
of June 22, 1992, effective in July 1992, companies whose 
foreign holdings already exceeded 10 percent could apply to 
Korea’s  securities and  exchange commission to  increase 
their limit to 25 percent. As of March 1993, four companies 
had  received  permission:  Korea  Electronic Parts,  Korea 
Long-Term  Credit  Bank,  Trigem  Computer,  and  Young 
Chang  Akki.  The  ceiling  automatically  declines  when 
foreign-held shares are sold to domestic investors. 
The limit on foreign ownership of Malaysian stocks is sub- 
ject to some debate. Bank Negara, the central bank, restricts 
the ownership of banks and financial institutions by foreign- 
ers to 30 percent. However, these limits do not appear to be 
strictly enforced. Under the 1989 Banking and Financial In- 
stitutions Act, the approval of the minister of finance is re- 
quired before foreign investors can buy or sell shares of a 
licensed bank or finance company amounting to 5 percent or 
more. Certain nonbank stocks have different foreign share 
holding limits for tax and other reasons. These are MIX, 
Proton, Telekom, Tenaga Nasional, Tai Wah Garments, and 
Yantzekiang. All other stocks are open to foreign portfolio 
investment without any limits. However, the approval of the 
Foreign Investment Committee is required for acquiring 15 
percent or more of the voting power of a company by  any 
one foreign interest and for acquiring the assets or interests 
of  a company when they exceed M$5  million, whether by 
Malaysian or foreign interests. Except for a few specific 









cases, the IFC uses 100 percent for most stocks and 30 per- 
cent for banks and financial institutions. 
Foreign  portfolio  investment  is  permitted  in  designated 
classes of  shares, and since May  1989 in most other shares 
through the use of the Nafinsa Trust arrangement. It is now 
considered  generally  100  percent  investable,  except  for 
banks, where foreign ownership is restricted to 30 percent. 
Closed to foreign investment. 
The market is considered 100 percent investable from Febru- 
ary 22, 1991. 
National law requires that a minimum of 60 percent of the 
issued shares of domestic corporations should be owned by 
Philippine nationals. To ensure compliance, Philippine com- 
panies typically issue two classes of stock: A shares, which 
may  be  traded  only  among  Philippine  nationals,  and  B 
shares, which may be traded to either Philippine nationals or 
foreign investors and which usually amount to 40 percent of 
the total. Mass media, retail trade, and rural banking compa- 
nies are closed to foreign investors. 
The market is considered generally 100 percent investable; 
some corporate statute limitations apply, particularly regard- 
ing shares issued in privatizations. 
The market was  opened to foreigners on January  1, 1991, 
though foreign investors must meet high registration require- 
ments and total cash inflows from abroad cannot currently 
exceed an official ceiling of $2.5 billion. There is a 10 per- 
cent limit on aggregate foreign ownership of issued capital. 
The domestic transportation industry is closed to foreign in- 
vestors. 
Various Thai laws  restrict foreign share holdings in  Thai 
companies engaged in certain areas of business. The Bank- 
ing Law restricts foreign ownership in banks to 49 percent. 
The Alien Business Law,  administered by  the Ministry of 
Commerce, restricts foreign ownership of stocks in specified 
sectors to 49 percent. In addition, other laws provide similar 
restrictions on foreign ownership. Restrictions are also faced 
by foreign investors through limits imposed by company by- 
laws, which range from 15 percent to 65 percent. The For- 
eign Board was established in  1988 to facilitate trading in 
shares registered in foreign names. 
The market is considered 100 percent investable from Au- 
gust 1989. 269  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Venezuela  Nonfinancial stocks are considered generally 100  percent in- 
vestable from January 1, 1990, but some restricted classes 
do exist. Bank stocks are currently not available. 




Alexander, G., Cheol Eun, and S. Janakiramanan. 1988. International listing and stock 
returns: Some empirical evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23 
Bailey, Warren, and Julapa Jagtiani. 1992. Time varying premiums for international 
investment: Some empirical estimates. Cornell University and Syracuse University. 
Mimeo. 
Bekaert, Geert. 1993. Market segmentation and investment barriers in emerging equity 
markets. In Portfolio investment in developing  countries, eds. Stijn Claessens and 
Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 228. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
Black, Fischer. 1974.  International  capital market equilibrium with investment barriers. 
Journal of Financial Economics  1: 337-52. 
. 1978. The ins and outs of foreign investment. Financial Analyst Journal 34 
(MayNune): 1-7. 
Buckberg, Elaine. 1993. Emerging stock markets and international asset pricing. In 
Portfolio  investment in developing  countries, eds. Stijn Claessens and  Sudarshan 
Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Papers, no.  228. Washington, D.C.:  The World 
Bank. 
Claessens, Stijn, Susmita Dasgupta, and Jack Glen.  1993. Stock price behavior in 
emerging stock markets. In Portfolio investment in developing countries, eds. Stijn 
Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Paper, no. 228. Washing- 
ton, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Harry Huizinga. 1992. Barriers to portfolio investment in 
emerging markets. PRE Working Paper no. 984. The World Bank. 
De Santis, Giorgio. 1993. Asset pricing and portfolio diversification: Evidence from 
emerging financial markets. In Portfolio  investment in developing  countries, eds. 
Stijn Claessens and  Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 228. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Divecha, Arjun, Jaime Drach, and Dan Stefek. 1992. Emerging markets: A quantitative 
perspective. Journal of Portfolio Management 19 (fall): 4  1-56. 
Diwan, Ishac, Vihang Enunza, and Lemma Senbet. 1993a. The pricing of country funds 
and their role in capital mobilization for emerging economies. PRE Working Paper 
no. 1058. The World Bank. 
. 1993b. Country funds for emerging economies. In Portfolio investment in de- 
veloping countries, eds. Stijn Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discus- 
sion Papers, no. 228. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Ermnza, Vihang, and Etienne Losq. 1985. International asset pricing under mild seg- 
mentation: Theory and test. Journal of Finance 40:105-24. 
(2): 135-52. 270  Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee 
. 1989. Capital flows, international asset pricing and investors’ welfare: a multi- 
county framework. Jouml of  Finance 44:  1025-37. 
Ermnza, Vihang, Etienne Losq, and Prasad Padmanabhan. 1992. Test of integration, 
mild segmentation and segmentation hypotheses. Journal of  Banking and Finance 
Eun, Cheol.  1990. International ownership structure and the cost of  capital: A case 
study of Swiss firms. University of Maryland. Mimeo. 
Eun, Cheol S., and S. Janakiramanan. 1986. A model of international asset pricing with 
a constraint on foreign equity ownership. Jouml of Finance 412397-914. 
. 1990. International ownership structure and the firm  value. University of 
Maryland. Mimeo, July, 1-29. 
Eun, Cheol, Stijn Claessens,  and Kwang Jun. 1993. International  trade of assets, pricing 
externalities  and the cost of capital. In Portfolio investment in developing countries, 
eds. Stijn Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 228. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Fama, Eugene. 1991. Efficient capital markets: 11.  Journal of  Finance 46(5):  1575- 
1617. 
Fama, Eugene, and James Macbeth. 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium: Empirical tests. 
Journal of  Political Economy 8 1  :607-36. 
Gibbons, Michael. 1980. Econometrics methods for testing a class of  financial mod- 
els-An  application of the nonlinear multivariate regression model. Ph.D. diss., Uni- 
versity of Chicago. 
. 1982. Multivariate tests of  financial models: A new approach. Journal of  Fi- 
nancial Economics 10:3-27. 
Gibbons, Michael R., Stephen A. Ross, and Jay Shanken. 1989. A test of the efficiency 
of a given portfolio. Econometrica 57: 1121-52. 
Harvey, Campbell R. 1993. Portfolio enhancement using emerging markets and condi- 
tioning information.  In Portfolio investment in developing countries, eds. Stijn Claes- 
sens and Sudarshan Gooptu. World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 228. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank. 
Hietala, Pekka. 1989. Asset pricing in partially segmented markets: Evidence from the 
Finnish Market. Journal of  Finance 44(3): 697-718. 
International Finance Corporation. Emerging markets factbook. Various years. 
Jorion, Philippe, and Eduardo Schwartz. 1986. Integration vs. segmentation in the Ca- 
nadian stock market. Journal of  Finance 41:603-14. 
Lessard, Donald. 1973. International portfolio diversification: A multivariate analysis 
for a group of Latin American countries. Journal of  Finance 28(3):619-33. 
. 1974. World, national and industry factors in equity returns. Journal of Fi- 
nance 29:379-9  1. 
Litzenberger, Robert H., and Krishna Ramaswamy. 1979. The effects of personal taxes 
and dividends on capital asset prices: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of 
Financial Economics 7(2): 163-96. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and A. Shapiro. 1986. Risk and return: consumption versus mar- 
ket beta. Review of  Economics and Statistics. 68 (August): 452-59. 
Mathieson, Donald J.,  and Liliana Rojas-Suirez. 1993. Liberalization of  the capital 
account: Experiences and issues. IMF Occasional Paper no. 103. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Mittoo, Usha R. 1992. Additional evidence on integration in the Canadian stock market. 
Journal of Finance 47(5): 2035-54. 
Reisen, Helmut, and Bernard Fischer. 1993.  Financial opening: Policy issues and expe- 
riences in developing countries. Paris: OECD Development Center. 
16:  949-72. 271  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
Stehle, Richard. 1977. An empirical test of  the alternative hypotheses of national and 
international pricing of risky assets. Jouml of  Finance 32:493-502. 
Stulz, RenC M. 1981. On the effects of barriers to international investment. Journal of 
Finance 36:923-34. 
Stulz, Re& M., and Walter Wasserfallen. 1992. Foreign equity restrictions and share- 
holder wealth maximization: Theory and evidence. NBER Working Paper no. A217. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, November. 
Tesar, Linda, and Ingrid Werner. 1993. U.S. Equity investment in emerging stock mar- 
kets. In Portfolio investment in developing countries, eds. Stijn Claessens and Sudar- 
shan Gooptu. World  Bank  Discussion Papers, no.  228.  Washington,  D.C.:  The 
World Bank. 
World Bank. 1993. World debt tables, 1993194. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
COIlNTlent  Michael Dooley 
This paper attempts to utilize the predictions of a capital asset pricing model 
to draw inferences about the extent of integration of emerging stock markets 
with equity markets in industrial countries. The basic idea is straightforward 
and appealing. If the markets are well integrated, excess returns of individual 
stocks in the emerging markets should be related to their covariance with the 
industrial country market portfolio. If the emerging markets are not integrated, 
excess returns should be related to their covariance with the domestic market 
portfolio. 
One reason to be concerned about the extent of integration is that it might 
help explain historically large inflows to emerging stock markets since 1989 
and the spectacular increases in the market value of these equities. An interest- 
ing conjecture is that foreign investors have  “finally” recognized that such 
equities are part of an efficient portfolio. If this is the driving force, we can 
understand the large inflows in part as a response of  international investors 
to opportunities to improve their risk-return trade-off. Such inflows would be 
expected even if the expected rate of return in emerging markets were the same 
as in the world portfolio. 
Another possibility is that emerging markets become more attractive for a 
given level of  integration because expected average returns have  improved. 
Such an improvement might be unrelated to diversification but instead be a 
result of changes in economic policies or the economic environment. In this 
case the equilibrium excess return on any individual stock would be related to 
its covariance with the domestic  portfolio. In fact, a reasonable interpretation is 
that recent capital inflows are returns of flight capital. In this case the emerging 
markets have not become more integrated since residents of  the developing 
countries have always had access to both domestic and international equity 
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markets. The evidence from excess rates of  return reported here are consistent 
with this hypothesis. 
The first result reported is that excess returns are better predicted by a model 
that assumes segmentation of  markets. One reason this might be the case is 
that legal restrictions continue to limit nonresidents’ holdings of  individual 
stocks in many emerging markets. In these circumstances it would not be sur- 
prising were excess returns to reflect the different legal and effective “access” 
of nonresidents to individual stocks. To control for this possibility the authors 
use an “investability index” published by the International Finance Corpora- 
tion (IFC) that measures the intensity of legal restrictions on emerging market 
stocks. As the authors point out, this proxy is imperfect and it is available for 
only a few years. But it seems clear that any test of integration of these markets 
should attempt to control for legal restrictions on nonresident holdings. 
Controlling for access, the authors again test the segmentation hypothesis 
using the covariance of excess rates of return as the measure of integration. The 
results are that neither access nor covariance with the world portfolio seems to 
predict excess returns. In contrast, access does seem to explain ex post price 
earnings ratios. 
This result suggests a fundamental difficulty in testing the capital asset pric- 
ing model in these markets. As the authors point out, legal restrictions were 
liberalized rapidly in many of  these markets over the short time period for 
which measures of access are available. If these liberalizations were unantici- 
pated, which seems quite likely for individual stocks, ex post excess returns are 
very poor predictors of expected returns. While realizations might be unbiased 
estimates of expected values, the noise might make it difficult to find the sys- 
tematic pattern suggested by the capital asset pricing model. 
The point is probably more general than the authors suggest. It seems quite 
implausible that the kinds of  movements in stock prices observed in recent 
years in emerging markets could have been expected. Ex post rates of return 
on the dollar-denominated Brady bonds issued by governments of these coun- 
tries have also been very high and in this case there clearly was no change in 
the access of nonresidents to these securities or the integration of world bond 
markets. Finally, privatization and other policy changes have generated large 
and probably unexpected changes in the market valuation of firms in emerging 
markets. In the context of first-order changes in first moments for returns on all 
investments in emerging markets, it is not surprising that the relatively subtle 
implications of a capital asset pricing model for first and second moments are 
difficult to capture. 273  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
COrlUIleIlt  Don Lessard 
Claessens and Rhee examine the impact of the opening of emerging markets 
to inward foreign investment on the pricing of emerging market assets from 
two perspectives: whether the risk-return relationship  for these assets is consis- 
tent with some form of a worldwide capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and 
whether within country, cross-sectional differences in asset prices correspond 
to differences in measurable barriers to inward investment. 
The answer to the first question-whether  the ex ante risk return relation- 
ship for emerging market equities is consistent with a worldwide CAPM-is 
definitely not or probably not. For ten of the sixteen markets examined, inte- 
gration is rejected, and segmentation is not rejected for any of them. 
These results are disappointing, but not surprising. The tests employed re- 
quire long data series from relatively stable risk and pricing structures, and 
yield mixed results even for major world markets that have been open to for- 
eign investment for some time and whose institutional structures have been 
relatively stable. Given that most of the countries in Claessens and Rhee’s sam- 
ple significantly altered the rules for inward investment within the sample pe- 
riod, often in conjunction with other policy and institutional changes such as 
drastic deficit reduction, monetary reform, privatization of major state enter- 
prises, the establishment  of vehicles for contractual savings, and the restructur- 
ing of  external obligations, it would have been a surprise if strong results had 
been obtained. 
Even the finding that segmentation cannot be rejected for any of the markets 
may reveal little about the relationship between ex ante returns and risk. It 
could also reflect the fact that returns in these countries have experienced large 
country-specific and countrywide ‘‘surprises’’ due to changes in objective local 
prospects, in local perceptions of those prospects, or in world investor percep- 
tions of those prospects or access to those markets. However, since the tests 
are well specified and conducted with great care, the results demonstrate the 
limits of this class of tests that rely on return data alone, rather than any short- 
coming in their application by Claessens and Rhee. 
The second approach, although less technically sophisticated, offers much 
more promise. It does not rely on returns data alone, but seeks to explain differ- 
ences in market valuations of  specific stocks, and by  inference the discount 
rates imbedded in them, by measurable differences in barriers to inward for- 
eign investment. Price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios, their dependent variable, are 
not a very good basis for comparison for two reasons. Earnings are not mea- 
sured uniformly across countries because of differences in accounting prac- 
tices and rates of inflation. Second, even within countries, firms differ in their 
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mix of assets in place, which give rise to current earnings, and growth opportu- 
nities, which give rise to future earnings. 
Claessens and Rhee are careful, though, and make these comparisons only 
within countries, mitigating the inflation and accounting issues. Most of the 
within-country variation in investability, as determined  by the International  Fi- 
nance Corporation (IFC), is the result of  differences in (a) the  sector repre- 
sented by the stock, given that many countries are more restrictive with respect 
to foreign ownership in banking, for example, than in industry at large; or (b) 
the stock's market capitalization, since small cap stocks are deemed to be less 
investable, presumably because of the fixed cost involved in following a partic- 
ular company. Claessens and Rhee control for the bank versus industry distinc- 
tion, and the result that P/E is a positive function of investability appears to 
hold. Given the size factor, though, the results must be viewed with caution. 
P/E itself may be correlated with a stock's market capitalization. Perhaps some 
other control for size that is not correlated with earnings, such as sales, could 
be employed. 
The larger question with respect to emerging markets, which both sets of 
tests address only obliquely, is the extent to which the boom that many of these 
markets have experienced in recent years is the result of changes in the pros- 
pects of those countries, or the recognition of these prospects or access to these 
markets by outside investors. While disentangling the two sets of factors would 
be very difficult, there is promise. The relationship between P/E ratios and 
sovereign debt prices/yields, for example, would largely separate country pros- 
pects from foreign investor awareness or access, since the sovereign debt has 
always been held primarily by  foreign banks, and typically in large enough 
concentrations so that the fixed costs of following a country cannot have been 
a major consideration. Awareness might be proxied by the marketing of a ma- 
jor stock issue on world markets, such as the Telmex flotation. Further, the 
diffusion of these effects across different assets from one country as well as 
across countries could provide important insights regarding causality. 
Both sets of tests, and much of the recent literature on emerging markets, 
assume on the basis of  the magnitude of capital flight from these countries 
that the binding barriers are on inward rather than outward investment. This 
assumption seems correct on its face, and I have used it many times, but upon 
reflection it may be  invalid. Clearly, wealthy individual investors from less- 
developed countries have been able to diversify abroad, but less wealthy indi- 
viduals who cannot effectively overcome the fixed costs of investing overseas 
and regulated investors such as pension funds or insurance companies are ef- 
fectively restricted. For a country such as Chile, where pension funds in aggre- 
gate are very  large relative to the value of local stocks and bonds, outward 
restrictions may be binding. Of course, inward or outward restrictions have a 
similar effect in that they cause local dimensions of risk to be priced, but the 
specification  of the spanning portfolios would differ. While this appears to be 
primarily a technical matter, it may also reflect a policy bias-that  the problem 275  The Effect of Equity Barriers 
of emerging countries is that they are not sufficiently open to inward foreign 
investment. The bigger issue in terms of world welfare is the opportunity cost 
imposed on local savers by restrictions that limit them to home assets that are 
highly risky on their own, but only weakly correlated with asset returns in the 
rest of the world. This was the point of my early work on international portfolio 
diversification for developing countries (Lessard 1973). Merton (1990) has 
proposed that rate of return swaps on broad market indexes be used to facilitate 
market integration. This recommendation is especially relevant for emerging 
markets where concerns over corporate governance and capital flight are para- 
mount. 
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